The purpose of the conference is to take stock of recent advances in the analysis of economic organization and institutions inspired by the work of 2009 Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson and to examine its implications for contemporary problems of organization and regulation. Empirical research and research informed by detailed industry and institutional knowledge is especially welcome.
- the nature, role, and implications of bounded rationality and opportunism as they relate to issues of contracting and the institutional framework governing contractual relationships
- government intervention in the market through regulation, antitrust policies, and direct investment (e.g., energy market and health care regulation; patent enforcement; concession contracts in alternative legal environments; government tax preferences for and subsidization of technologies and markets)
- the operation and regulation of financial markets and institutions (e.g., the origins of and responses to the financial crisis; the role of credit rating agencies; financial and futures market organization and regulation)
- legal and economic determinants of corporate organization, from joint ventures to the organization of corporate boards (e.g, labor restrictions and corporate organization; organization of high technology companies; regulation of corporate boards)